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REASSESSING THE INFLUENCE OF THE
NUREMBERG CODE ON AMERICAN
MEDICAL ETHICS
Jonathan D. Moreno, Ph.D.*
John Fletcher's career is marked both by his vigilant defense of the
rights of human research subjects, and by his determined insistence that
important medical studies proceed under ethically acceptable conditions.
Appropriately, this celebration of John Fletcher's career' coincides with
the fiftieth anniversary of the Nuremberg Code ("Code"). The formula-
tion of the Code by the judges in the war crimes trial of Nazi doctors
following World War If marked the beginning of the modern effort to
ensure ethical conduct in research. This Article considers the role of the
Code and its effect upon certain aspects of the evolution of research stan-
dards in the United States, a process that John Fletcher greatly influ-
enced. This Article argues that recent revelations about Cold War era
deliberations among high ranking officials enable a far more deeper un-
derstanding of the Code's role during the years following the war than
had been possible before this material was unclassified.
I. JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG
On August 19, 1947, the war crimes trials of twenty-three Nazi physi-
cians and bureaucrats in Nuremberg, West Germany, came to a close.
Known variously as United States v. Karl Brandt et al.,2 the Nuremberg
Medical Trial, or the "Medical Case" (to distinguish it from the trials of
Nazi political, industrial and military leaders), 3 the trials began on De-
* The author worked on the staff of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation
Experiments. The enclosed views are those of the author and do not represent the views of
the Advisory Committee.
1. Franklin G. Miller, Dedicatory Essay on John C. Fletcher, 13 J. CONTEMp. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y ix-xiv (1996).
2. The Medical Case, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribu-
nals under Control Council Law No. 10 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949).
3. Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, Final Report of the Ad-
visory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments 75 (1996) [hereinafter Advisory
Committee].
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cember 9, 1946. The trials took far longer than the prosecution expected
because the issues were more complex than they appreciated at the out-
set. The defense was able to argue and present evidence that the conven-
tions or the common practice of human subject research were ambiguous,
contrary to the claims of prosecution witnesses. In the end, however, the
three judges, all Americans, found fifteen of the defendants guilty of
atrocities, sentencing seven to death.4
The case presented by the defense apparently left a deep impression
upon the Nuremberg judges. Rather than simply rule on the guilt or in-
nocence of the defendants, the judges decided to formulate a set of state-
ments that would leave no doubt about which ethical principles must
govern the use of human beings in medical science. In this effort, they
were influenced strongly by Dr. Andrew Ivy, an expert witness sent by
the American Medical Association ("AMA") to testify on medical ethics
at the trials.5 Dr. Ivy conducted experiments in the United States on
questions similar to those pursued by the Nazi researchers, including sea-
water desalination and the effects of high altitudes. More significantly,
Dr. Ivy sometimes used human subjects.6
In August 1946, Ivy prepared a twenty-two page document setting out
the rule of human experimentation, giving one copy to the AMA's Judi-
cial Council and another to the Nuremberg prosecutors.7 On December
11, 1946, the AMA House of Delegates approved a somewhat shorter
version of Ivy's rules, which were published subsequently along with
other items of business in the Journal of the American Medical Associa-
tion.8 The most important provisions of the Code itself, which was pub-
lished along with the rest of the 'tribunal's judgment in August 1947,
reproduced verbatim most of Ivy's language, as well as two contributions
from a memorandum prepared by the other American expert witness, Dr.
Leo Alexander.9 The Code also was accompanied by the judges' asser-
tion that these principles already were widely understood in the scientific
4. Id. See also The Medical Case, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 75-76.
7. Id. at 76.
8. Supplementary Report of the Judicial Council, Proceedings of the House of Dele-
gates Annual Meeting, 9-11 Dec. 1946, 132 JAMA 1090 (Dec. 28, 1946). See also William
A. Coventry, Report of the Reference Committee on Miscellaneous Business, Proceedings of.
the House of Delegates Meeting, 9-11 Dec. 1946, 133 JAMA 35 (1947). See Advisory Com-
mittee, supra note 3, at 77.
9. Advisory Committee, supra note 3, at 76-77.
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community.' 0 Were that the case, a critic might wonder why was it neces-
sary to formulate them in this context. Why would a simple declaration
of guilt or innocence based on the facts of the matter not be sufficient?
II. THE NUREMBERG CODE IN THE UNITED STATES:
THE STANDARD VIEW
Although the trials themselves were not followed closely in the United
States, the guilty verdicts did make the front page of the New York
Times." What then, was the influence of the Code in the United States,
especially in the years immediately following the trials? Most commenta-
tors believe the influence of the Code in the United States was im-
perceptible. According to historian David Rothman, "the prevailing view
was that [the Nuremberg medical defendants] were Nazis first and last; by
definition nothing they did, and no code drawn up in response to them,
was relevant to the United States.'
2
At least four rationales Supported this attitude, First, once the conduct
of the Nazi doctors became known, it was regarded as so extreme and sui
generis as to have little or no bearing on civilized people who conducted
scientific research according to their consciences. Second, the concentra-
tion camps were regarded as a radically different environment from any-
thing resembling a normal setting for medical studies, far more cruel than
even a conventional prison. Third, the longstanding tradition of medical
ethics, embodied in the beneficent philosophy of the Hippocratic Oath,
was regarded as a generally adequate basis upon which the medical pro-
fession could police itself. Fourth, the Code's absolute requirement for
the "voluntary consent of the subject" obviously was inapplicable to
populations upon whom important medical research was being done, and
had been done for some time, including children. 3
To be sure, there were some exceptions to the perception that the Code
did not apply to normal medical research with human subjects. Although
most popular press coverage of human-subject research was highly sensa-
tional, there were occasional critical articles exposing the use of "human
10. Id. at 77.
11. Id. at 85.
12. David Rothman, Strangers at the Bedside: A History of How Law and Bioethics
Transformed Medical Decision Making 62, 62-63 (1994).
13. Susan E. Lederer & Michael A. Grodin, Historical Overview: Pediatric Experi-
mentation, in MICHAEL A. GRODIN & LEONARD H. GLANTZ, CHILDREN AS RESEARCH
SUBJECTS 3-28 (1994).
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guinea pigs" in the years following World War 11.14 In the early 1950's,
sociologist Renee Fox found that physician-scientists in a metabolic re-
search ward were highly sensitive to the ethical dilemmas they faced, and
paraphrased the Nuremberg Code as the principle upon which the re-
searchers she observed based their use of human subjects. 15 But as medi-
cal researcher Jay Katz has observed, most of the medical research
community has adopted this view: "[The Nuremberg Code] was a good
code for barbarians but an unnecessary code for ordinary physicians." 16
More pertinent to the territory staked out in this Article is the influ-
ence of the Code in the legal sphere. Professor Leonard Glantz has ar-
gued that the Code has had little influence on federal regulations for the
conduct of human subjects research,17 though his survey does not include
the defense establishment, which is the focus of this Article. Professor
George Annas has noted that the first United States court citation of the
Code was in 1973, and concludes from his analysis of its subsequent influ-
ence in court decisions that national security generally has trumped the
Code in cases involving the abuse of human beings by defense-related
federal agencies during the Cold War.
18
Stanley v. United States, 9 is the only United States Supreme Court case
that comments on the Code, and then only in dissent.2" In Stanley, an
Army sergeant attempted to bring suit against the government for sub-
jecting him to illegal drug experimentation, but his case was dismissed
under the Feres doctrine which prohibits members of the Armed Forces
from suing the government for harms inflicted "incident to service."21
14. See e.g., John L. O'Hara, The Most Unforgettable Character I've Met, READER'S
DIGEST, May 1948, at 30, 31; Thomas Koritz, J.M.D., I Was a Human Guinea Pig, SATUR-
DAY EVENING POST, July 25, 1953, at 27.
15. RENEE C. Fox, EXPERIMENT PERILOUS: PHYSICIANS AND PATIENTS FACING THE
UNKNOWN 69, 69-71, 112 n.16, 227-29 (1959).
16. Advisory Committee, supra note 3, at 86 (op. Jay Katz).
17. LEONARD H. GLANTZ, The Influence of the Nuremberg Code on U.S. Statutes and
Regulations, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE 183 (George J. Annas &
Michael A. Grodin eds,, 1992). See Claire A. Milner, Comment, Gulf War Guinea Pigs: Is
Informed Consent Optional During War, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 199, 211-18
(1996) (discussing the extent to which the principles of the Code have been incorporated
into the law of the United States).
18. GEORGE J. ANNAS, The Nuremberg Code in U.S. Courts: Ethics versus Expediency,
in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE 201 (George J. Annas & Michael A.
Grodin eds., 1992).
19. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
20. Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
21. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 669. For a more detailed discussion of Stanley and the Feres
doctrine, see Milner, supra note 17, at 219-23.
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The remainder of this Article reassesses the influence of the Code on
American medical ethics in the decade immediately following the Medi-
cal Trials, especially in the national security establishment. Recent infor-
mation suggests that the Code was influential in quarters that many
would find surprising. For example, although the Code's influence did
not reached the medical profession or research community, it did flourish
in the councils of the national security establishment as part of planning
for defense against unconventional atomic, biological, and chemical
weaponry during the decade following World War II.
This reassessment is both prompted and justified by the Final Report of
the President's Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments,
released by President Clinton on October 3, 1995. The appointment of
the Committee was followed by press reports of government sponsored,
unethical and often secret experiments on human beings conducted be-
tween during 1944 and 1974. These experiments included injecting hospi-
talized patients with plutonium, feeding radiation-laced breakfast cereal
to institutionalized adolescents, exposing cancer patients to total-body ir-
radiation, and irradiating the testicles of prisoners in state penitentiaries.
In order to determine whether the experiments conformed to the ethical
standards of the day, or those currently recognized, the Advisory Com-
mittee was granted unprecedented access to thousands of pages of for-
merly classified documents relating to the development of human
research policies within the national security establishment. As a mem-
ber of the Committee staff, I was charged with helping the Committee
come to an understanding of the nature and significance of these histori-
cal standards.
III. POST-WAR NOTICE OF NUREMBERG IN THE ATOMIC
ENERGY COMMISSION
In its investigation of the post-war period, 1946 to 1948, the Committee
found that there was a flurry of activity surrounding the use of human
subjects in 1947 in the newly formed Atomic Energy Commission
("AEC"), the civilian entity that inherited many of the programs and
contracts of the Manhattan Project.22 This activity was inspired in part,
by a series of plutonium injections administered to hospitalized patients
22. The Manhattan Project was the code name for the World War II-era, U.S. govern-
ment-sponsored research and development program that led to the atomic bomb. It con-
tinues as a common informal reference to the project. Advisory Committee, supra note 3,
at 46-53.
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with diagnoses of bone cancer during the war, which apparently were in-
tended to help provide the AEC information about safe levels of expo-
sure for laboratory workers handling fission products.23 While the
Committee did not conclude that the AEC was influenced directly by the
Nuremberg Trials or the subsequent Code, the AEC's response to the
injection project was an attempt to ensure that its contractor physicians
agreed to certain standards in the use of human subjects.24 These stan-
dards were expressed in the AEC General Manager's response to two
different inquiries.25
The first response, a letter written in April 1947, indicated the AEC's
"expectation that [research with human subjects] may have therapeutic
effect,",26 as well as the requirement of proof that "each individual pa-
tient, being in an understanding state of mind, was clearly informed of the
nature of the treatment and its possible effects, and expressed his willing-
ness to receive the treatment., 27 The April letter also required that two
physicians must certify in writing that these conditions were satisfied.2 8
The second response, a November 1947 letter, went even further; requir-
ing that the "patient give his, complete and informed consent in writing
9929
As an advisor to a subcommittee of the President's cabinet, the Com-
mittee had to analyze carefully the surviving documentary evidence from
the agency during that period at hand. That evidence did not include
specific reference to the Medical Trials that were still taking place at Nu-
remberg in April 1947, nor did it include the fact that the trials were con-
cluded by November of that year. The most that the Committee could
conclude with certainty was that the AEC was aware of the potentially
negative legal and public relations effects of publicity surrounding the
plutonium injections. The AEC's concern was evidenced by the March
1947 recommendation of AEC's Medical Division and Public Relations
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Letter from Carroll L. Wilson, General Manager of the AEC to Stafford Warren,
the University of California at Los Angeles, (Apr. 30, 1947) (on file with National Archives
& Records Admin., College Park, Md., in Record Group 220 by ACHRE No. DOE-
052094-A-439). See also Letter from Carroll L. Wilson, General Manager of the AEC, to
Robert Stone, University of California, (Nov. 5, 1947) (on file with National Archives &
Records Admin., College Park, Md., in Record Group 220 by ACHRE No. DOE-052295-
A-i).
26. Letter from Wilson to Warren, supra note 25.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Letter from Wilson to Stone, supra note 25.
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department to continue the classified status of a paper about the experi-
ment.30 Similarly, an unsigned October 1947 memorandum to the AEC's
Advisory Board on Biology and Medicine suggested that "[t]here is per-
haps a greater responsibility if a federal agency condones human guinea
pig experimentation."'"
It is reasonable to assume based on the evidence before the Commit-
tee, that the national security establishment was aware of the Nuremberg
proceedings and the implications of Nuremberg on human subject re-
search. Yet it would have been remarkable if the lawyers and administra-
tors who were charged with responsibility for the nation's nuclear arsenal,
and whose agency had a virtual monopoly control over the availability of
radioisotopes for medical or any other purposes, had not taken note of
the proceedings then taking place in Nuremberg. The likelihood that
they did take note is given credence by a remark made by an AEC official
several years later, in 1950.32 The AEC and the Department of Defense
("DOD") were engaged in planning a joint project called Nuclear Energy
for the Propulsion of Aircraft ("NEPA").33 Of particular concern was
the amount of radiation to which an air crew could safely be exposed by
the energy source of the aircraft.34 One of the physician consultants was
Robert Stone, who was the recipient of the November 1947 letter from
the AEC general manager that required "informed consent."35 Stone
proposed that human experimentation was the only method of obtaining
the needed information.36 But the AEC's Division of Biology and
Medicine chief, Shields Warren, objected.37 In a meeting of the AEC-
30. Letter from Major B. M. Brundage, Chief of Medical Division of the AEC to the
Declassification Section, (Mar. 19, 1947) ("Clearance of Technical Documents") (on file
with National Archives & Records Admin., College Park, Md., in Record Group 220 by
ACHRE No. DOE-113094-B-4).
31. Memorandum from unknown author to the Advisory Board on Biology and
Medicine, (Oct. 8, 1947) (on file with National Archives & Records Admin., College Park,
Md., in Record Group 220 by ACHRE No. DOE-0151094-A-502).
32. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of the Army to the Director of Medi-
cal Services, Office of the Secretary of Defense, (May 3, 1950) (on file with the National
Archives & Records Admin., College Park, Md., in Record Group 220 by ACHRE No.
DOE-113094-B-4).
33. Shields Warren, at the Meeting of the AEC-DOD Joint Panel on the Medical As-
pects of Atomic Warfare 28, transcript available in the National Archives, (Nov. 10, 1950)
(on file with National Archives & Records Admin., College Park, Md., in Record Group
220 by ACHRE No. DOE-012795-C-1).
34. Id.
35. Letter from Wilson to Stone, supra note 25.
36. Warren, supra note 33.
37. Id.
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DOD Joint Panel on the Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare, during
which the use of "prisoner volunteers" was proposed, Warren replied:
"It's not very long since we got through trying Germans for doing exactly
the same thing.",
38
Further, a 1951 exchange, between the AEC's Division of Biology and
Medicine and the Commission's Los Alamos Laboratory, indicates that
the spirit, if not the letter, of the Nuremberg Code was known outside
AEC's central office.3 9 A Los Alamos information officer, Leslie
Redman, inquired about the AEC's policies on human experimentation,
which were known only vaguely at the Lab (and which strongly suggests
that neither of the sets of rules in the two 1947 letters was widely dissemi-
nated).40 Redman said that his understanding was that "these regulations
are comparable to those of the American Medical Association .... 4
Thus, although Redman was not familiar with the two 1947 letters, the
AMA principles, which were in essence the same as those expressed in
the Code, did make an impression on the "culture" of radiation research.
IV. THE NUREMBERG CODE IN THE PENTAGON
The Joint Panel's proposal to conduct prisoner experiments, opposed
by the AEC's Shields Warren, was also hotly debated in the Pentagon; all
of these discussions were, of course, highly classified. Interestingly, the
two major uniformed services, the Army and the Navy, split on the ques-
tion of prisoner experimentation in 1950, with the Army opposing the
proposal and the Navy favoring it. The Assistant Secretary of the Army
argued that animal studies should be continued instead of human subject
research, and noted that the Joint Panel's proposal was rejected by the
Committee on Medical Sciences of the Pentagon's Research and Devel-
opment Board.42 While the Assistant Secretary technically was correct,
the Committee did not close off the possibility of the proposal for human
experiments entirely, but referred the matter back to the Joint Panel for
further consideration.43 At least two of the Committee's physician mem-
38. Id.
39. Letter from Leslie M. Redman, Los Alamos Laboratory, to Dr. Alberto F. Thomp-
son, Chief of Technical Information Service, DBM, (Jan. 22, 1951) (on file with National




42. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of the Army to the Director of Medi-
cal Services, supra note 32.
43. Id.
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bers seemed to agree that human studies could be done so long as they
conformed with the December 1946 AMA principles.44 Clearly, by 1950,
the AMA-Nuremberg principles were on the minds of many medical ad-
visors in the national security establishment.
The human experimentation debate raged on in the Pentagon for the
following two years.45 Finally, in mid-October 1952, a Defense Depart-
ment lawyer named Stephen S. Jackson determined that the Nuremberg
Code principles would have to be used in their entirety because they "al-
ready had international juridical sanction. ''46 Jackson so advised the
Armed Forces Medical Policy Council ("AFMPC"), a high level Pentagon
body that was chaired by Dr. Melvin Casberg.47 At their October 13,
1952 meeting, the AFMPC recommended that the Department of De-
fense adopt the Code as its policy for the use of human experimental
subjects, with one addition recommended by Jackson: that prisoners of
war explicitly were ruled out as research participants.48
The significance of Jackson's conclusion should not be treated lightly.
Jackson's conclusion contrasts remarkably with the later rejections of the
Code by courts that viewed its principles as superseded by national secur-
ity considerations.49 However, as the documentary evidence only re-
cently available makes clear, in 1952, a Pentagon lawyer recognized the
Code as good law that applied to the United States Department of De-
fense.5" Justice Jackson's conclusion was supported strongly by an Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, Anna M.
Rosenberg. 51 Rosenberg not only concurred in the Pentagon counsel's
view, but also recommended the addition of a clause that required the
written consent of the potential subject.52 Thus, the AFMPC "strongly
44. Meeting of the Committee on Medical Sciences of the Research and Development
Board, Department of Defense, transcript (partial), (May 23, 1950) (on file with National
Archives & Records Admin., College Park, Md., in Record Group 220 by ACHRE No.
DOE-012795-C-1).
45. Id.
46. Letter from Adam J. Rapalski, Administrator, Armed Forces Epidemiological
Board, DOD, to Colin MacLeod, President, Armed Forces Epidemiological Board, DOD,
(Mar. 2, 1953) (on file with National Archives & Records Admin., College Park, Md., in
Record Group 220 by ACHRE No. NARA 012395-A-5).
47. Advisory Committee, supra note 3, at 57.
48. Id.; see also Letter from Stephen S. Jackson to Dr. Melvin A. Casberg, Advisory
Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, Final Report 279 (Supp. 1995).
49. See ANNAS, supra note 18, at 209.
50. See Rapalski, supra note 46.
51. Advisory Committee, supra note 3, at 57.
52. See Stephen S. Jackson, Assistant General Counsel in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense and Counsel for the Armed Forces Medical Policy Council, DOD, to Melvin A.
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recommended that a policy be established for the use of human volun-
teers (military and civilian employees) in experimental research at
Armed Forces facilities, 53 and that such use "be subject to the principles
and conditions laid down as a result of the Nuremberg Trials.
54
But the path of the Code through the Pentagon hierarchy was still not a
smooth one. Internal opposition to a written human subjects policy was
considerable; its "controversial character" was admitted by George V.
Underwood, the Director of the Executive Office of the Secretary of De-
fense early in 1953."5 Underwood then attempted to win the strong en-
dorsement of the proposal by the three uniformed service secretaries
prior to the new administration of President-elect Eisenhower.56 This ef-
fort failed, however, and it was agreed instead that the matter should be
called to the attention of Eisenhower's incoming Secretary of Defense,
Charles E. Wilson, as he was the one who would have to implement it.57
When the new Secretary of Defense approved the AFMPC's recom-
mendation on February 26, 1953, he could not have had much time to
study what perhaps had been the single most debated subject in Pentagon
medical circles for the previous three years. As the former Chief Execu-
tive of General Motors, Charles E. Wilson brought with him an expedi-
tious management style, and was accustomed to relying on the judgment
of responsible subordinates. Because he was not an expert on medical
issues himself, Wilson must have appreciated the need to prepare for ex-
pected Soviet and Chinese challenges in unconventional atomic, biologi-
cal, and chemical warfare. His experience in labor relations also might
have taught him the importance of written contracts and protection from
liability. The preamble to the Nuremberg Code-based memorandum
specifies that the human experiments being contemplated were "the only
feasible means for realistic evaluation and/or development of effective
Casberg, Chairman of the Armed Forces Medical Policy Council, (Oct. 22, 1952) (ACHRE
No. NARA-101294-A) (stating that Assistant Secretary of Defense Rosenberg recom-
mended the additional language).
53. Memorandum from Melvin A. Casberg, Chairman of the Armed Forces Medical
Policy Council, DOD, to the Secretary of Defense, (Jan. 13, 1953) Advisory Committee on
Human Radiation Experiments 305 (Supp. 1995).
54. Id.
55. Memorandum from George V. Underwood, Director of the Executive Office of
the Secretary of Defense, to Deputy Secretary Foster, (Jan. 4, 1953) Advisory Committee
on Human Radiation Experiments, Final Report 304 (Supp. 1995).
56. Memorandum from George V. Underwood, Director of the Executive Office of
the Secretary of Defense, to Mr. Keys, Deputy Secretary of Defense, (Feb. 5, 1953) Advi-
sory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, Final Report 307 (Supp. 1995).
57. Id.
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preventive measures of defense against atomic, biological or chemical
agents ....
V. THE NUREMBERG CODE MEETS HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL
As several commentators59 have noted, the Code never established a
firm foothold in United States statutes or regulations. This fact was the
result of both the Code's failure to address research on those who were
unable to give "voluntary consent," such as children, and to a cultural
resistance towards external regulation on the part of the medical
profession.
In 1959, the National Society for Medical Research ("NSMR") held a
conference at the University of Chicago on legal issues in medicine. An
NSMR "Committee on the Re-Evaluation of the Nuremberg Experimen-
tal Principles" recommended that consent be understood as "either ex-
plicit or reasonably presumed," and that third-parties be allowed to give
permission for those who are incapable of consenting to research.6 °
From 1954 to 1964, the World Medical Association discussed its own
research code of ethics, generally referred to as the Declaration of Hel-
sinki ("Declaration"). 61 Developed by representatives of the medical re-
search community itself, the Declaration differed from the Code in
several important ways, which included a more flexible view of subject
consent at such time as research participation can be considered to be
potentially beneficial to the subject.
62
In 1961, several years before the Declaration, administrators at
Harvard Medical School became concerned about a new clause in its
Army medical research contracts. The language in this clause essentially
reiterated the Code and applied it to the Army's contract researchers, as
well as to research conducted by the Army itself. An assistant dean of
the medical school, Dr. Joseph W. Gardella, noted that "[t~he Nuremberg
Code was conceived in reference to Nazi atrocities .... [T]he Code ... is
not necessarily pertinent to or adequate for the conduct of medical re-
58. Memorandum from Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Army, Secretary
of the Navy, Secretary of the Air Force, (Feb. 26, 1953) ("Use of Human Volunteers in
Experimental Research") (ACHRE No. DOD-082394).
59. These commentators include George Annas and Leonard Glantz. See ANNAS,
supra note 18, at 201; see also GLANTZ, supra note 17, at 183.
60. National Society for Medical Research, Report on the National Conference on the
Legal Environment of Medicine 88 (May 27-28, 1959).
61. 21 C.F.R. § 312.120(c)(4) (1996).
62. Id. See also Milner, supra note 17, at 209-11 (outlining the differences between the
Code and the Declaration and the history of the Declaration).
1997]
358 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 13:347
search in the United States."63 Dr. Gardella also questioned whether
those who are sick are capable of understanding complex information, an
issue that has been a concern of more recent scholarship in biomedical,
ethics.'
When Dr. Gardella presented his discussion to the medical school ad-
ministrative board in 1962, a board member, Dr. Henry Beecher, agreed
to draft a statement of Harvard's principles concerning human research.65
Dr. Beecher published a paper in the New England Journal of Medicine
that contended there were numerous examples of the abuse of human
subjects in the published medical literature.66 Dr. Beecher's article,
"Ethics and Clinical Research," proved to be one of the most influential
events in the history of modern medical ethics.67 However, Beecher re-
lied less on subject consent as a protection for research participants, par-
ticularly those who are ill, than he did on the relationship between the
patient and his or her physician. 68 In short order, Beecher and his
Harvard colleagues succeeded in persuading the Army to permit them to
substitute their principles for the Nuremberg Code language in their re-
search contracts.
69
VI. CHANGING A PROFESSIONAL CULTURE
The failure of the AEC and Pentagon policies to penetrate the cultures
of their respective professional communities provides an important lesson
about the reform of deeply ingrained practices among highly trained ex-
perts. In both cases, lawyers and non-physician administrators attempted
to impose conditions that were regarded as irrelevant or unrealistic by
medical researchers. Although there was apparent willingness to accept
AEC central office research requirements at the contract laboratories, it
is important to appreciate that, by the early 1950's, the human subjects
exposed to ionizing radiation for experimental purposes were mainly nor-
mal healthy research volunteers. By contrast, in the late 1940's, those
who were subjects in radiation experiments were often sick patients, for
whom the appropriateness of a consent process was met with much skep-
63. Advisory Committee, supra note 3, at 90.
64. Id. at 91.
65. Id.
66. Henry K. Beecher, M.D., Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW. ENG. J. MED.
1354, 1354-55 (1966).
67. Id. at 1354-60.
68. Id. at 1355.
69. Advisory Committee, supra note 3, at 91.
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ticism. We saw the same dynamic at work fifteen years later in the
NSMR committee report, Harvard Medical School's reception of the Nu-
remberg Code clause in its Army contracts, and in the Declaration of
Helsinki.7 °
To appreciate the true influence of the Code, one must abandon the
expectation that, to be influential, it would have to be accepted immedi-
ately and openly and integrated into the actual practices of the research
community. Instead, the Code's attempt to articulate the ethics of re-
search was flawed, and the initial reception given it by most researchers
was also flawed. Nevertheless, the root principle of consent proved hard
to ignore. Even as efforts were made to massage and transform it, events
such as the Thalidomide tragedy7' and the Tuskegee study,72 in the 1960's
and 1970's, 73 brought home its forceful truth, however poorly expressed.
With a logic that seems inexorable in retrospect, the Code first was seen
as obviously applying to imprisoned and oppressed persons, then to all
healthy subjects, then to those who were sick but would not benefit from
an experiment, and then finally to those who were sick but stood a chance
of benefitting from research participation. In fact, it was not logic that
was operative in this evolution, but a growth in moral perception.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the principle of informed consent to research participation is
now well established even for those who are sick there is still reluctance
among many medical professionals to accept that patients facing serious
medical problems are able to process information about innovative thera-
pies. The Advisory Committee's Subject Interview Study of hundreds of
patients throughout the country found varying levels of understanding of
research, but widespread trust among research subjects in medical profes-
sionals and medical institutions.74 The juxtaposition of limited under-
standing and exceptional trust gives reason for concern about the
consequences if the public begins to discern reasons for more skepticism
of the research enterprise. John Fletcher's career has been marked by an
unyielding commitment to the advancement of scientific knowledge, but
70. Id.
71. Id. at 92. See RUTH FADEN & TOM BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF
INFORMED CONSENT 203 (1986) (discussing the Thalidomide tragedy).
72. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 71, at 167.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 475-76.
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only under conditions in which the trust of research subjects has been
earned.
